EU Grand Strategy: Optimism is Mandatory.  Egmont Security Policy Brief No. 36, July 2012 by Biscop, Sven.
  1 
EU Grand Strategy: Optimism is Mandatory 
Sven Biscop 
 
The Arab Spring, the American pivot, and 
the  global  crisis:  these  affect  all  of  EU 
external  action,  but  also  present 
opportunities  for  EU  action.  A  debate  on 
grand strategy remains necessary. 
INTRODUCTION:  A  QUESTION  OF 
STRATEGY  
Should  the  European  Union  have  a  new 
European  Security  Strategy  (ESS)?  The  correct 
answer  is  yes.  But  perhaps  the  question  is 
wrong. Or we have focussed on the wrong side 
of  it.  The  question  has  generated  a  bit  of  a 
debate – but really only a bit – about the pros 
and cons of revising the 2003 text.  
 
Is a revision worth the effort if in decision-
making Member States do not even refer to the 
existing  document?  That  they  have  stopped 
doing so proves that the ESS has reached the 
age limit – relevance requires revision. Would 
the exercise not have too divisive an impact? 
Again, it is precisely because Member States are 
divided  that  a  real  strategic  debate  is  all  the 
more urgent. But should this be a priority in the 
midst  of  a  financial  and  economic  crisis? 
Exactly:  the  scarcer  the  resources,  the  more 
important the strategy – one wants to spend the 
means one does have in the most relevant way. 
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Should  one  not  focus  first  on  consolidating 
the  European  External  Action  Service 
(EEAS)? That is a great tool indeed, but no 
more than that: a tool, a means – which can 
only be meaningful if it serves clear ends. And 
involving  the  EEAS  staff,  with  their  various 
backgrounds,  into  a  strategic  exercise  would 
help forge the shared culture that they need to 
function effectively. Just hypothetically then, if 
one  would  embark  upon  this  endeavour, 
should one start from a blank page or amend 
the existing document? Definitely the former, 
if one wants some creative ideas. And would it 
be  possible  to  produce  such  a  concise  and 
readable text again? If one keeps the number 
of drafters below the number of pages, sure.  
 
Pushed  most  vocally  by  Sweden  (which 
formally  proposed  a  review  in  2011)  and 
Finland,  the  “aye”  camp  got  the  explicit 
support  of  Poland  and  Italy,  plus  the  large 
majority  of  the  small  number  of  academics 
who  care  about  the  ESS.  Intellectual  weight 
does not equal political power though. Having 
managed to have “strategic priorities” included 
on  the  agenda  of  the  March  2012  informal 
Gymnich meeting of EU foreign ministers, the 
coalition proved insufficiently grand to tip the 
balance. Rather than a negative decision, the 
Gymnich  saw  a  non-decision.  That  was 
perhaps even more effective in removing the 
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ESS from the agenda again.  
 
But perhaps the most important side of the 
question never made it to the agenda in the first 
place. The debate mostly focused on form and 
process: does the EU need to produce a new 
ESS-type document? That obscured the much 
more  fundamental  debate  on  substance.  The 
Arab Spring, the American strategic shift to the 
Asia-Pacific,  the  crisis:  all  denote  major 
geopolitical change. Does the EU have a strategy 
able  to  cope?  Put  that  way,  answering  with  a 
straightforward  yes  is  overly  optimistic  (even 
though optimism is mandatory, as we shall see). 
This is easily proved: ask anybody working on, 
for, or with the EU whether he/she sees the 
Union  as  a  game-changer  in  international 
politics  today,  or  even  simply  as  a  strategic 
actor. At best, the response will be hesitation; 
most  will  simply  say  no.  Nobody,  in 
comparison,  would  hesitate  for  a  second  to 
respond  positively  were  they  asked  the  same 
about the United States or China.  
 
There is a most urgent need to debate EU 
strategy  therefore,  not  about  in  what  form  it 
should be written down (if at all) and by whom, 
but about what it should say.  
 
THE  ARAB  SPRING:  FOUR  SEASONS  IN 
ONE DAY  
The Arab Spring is happening in spite of the 
EU,  not  thanks  to  it.  That  fact  calls  for  a 
serious  reappraisal  of  the  European 
Neighbourhood Policy (ENP). More for More is 
a  start,  but  to  shape  a  positive  outcome  that 
appears  less  and  less  certain  it  might  not  be 
sufficient.  
 
Be there new regimes, or just old regimes in 
a new guise, old regimes clinging to power by 
every means, or old regimes seeking transition 
without too much instability: there will be new 
alignments  within  and  between  the  States  in 
our southern neighbourhood. Not to mention 
the involvement of great and would-be powers 
from outside. There is no need for alarmism: in 
military terms, there is no threat to Europe’s 
territory from the region. (The crisis in Syria 
shows  the  limits  of  what  we  can  do  in t h e  
region though; on the other hand never before 
was there a call for European intervention from 
the region, as in Libya). But the possibility of a 
“ring of the indifferent” or even of a “ring of 
the openly hostile” to Europe and its values 
substituting  for  the  hoped  for  “ring  of 
friends”,  is  real  enough.  The  impact  on  our 
leverage  to  shape  and  work  with  our 
neighbourhood  will  be  enormous.  Safe  trade 
routes, a secure energy supply and manageable 
migration are but the most obvious interests at 
stake.  
 
Leverage  starts  with  legitimacy.  Public 
opinion throughout the region mostly sees the 
EU as a status quo power, whose commitment 
to reform was never sincere. With those found 
to be willing (for whom we should be actively 
searching)  as  well  as  palatable  (which  we 
should be actively stimulating), a much more 
profound engagement must now be sought in 
order  to  retain  (or  regain)  influence  and 
safeguard our vital interests. This is not about 
building an EU sphere of influence (no need 
for our neighbours to look up to us) but about 
a new chance to build a balanced partnership 
(we do hope that our neighbours will not look 
away from us).  
 
The extent of cooperation with each regime 
is  a  most  delicate  decision.  Are  all  citizens 
physically  safe  from  their  own  government? 
The answer to that question determines the red 
line  for  partnership.  With  other  regimes  a 
careful balance will have to be sought, working 
with  religiously  inspired  parties  without 
promoting sectarianism, working with existing 
regimes  without  consolidating  their  more 
authoritarian traits, and nudging them towards 
transition  without  causing  chaos.  Finding  a 
regional  arrangement  also  that  involves  all 
outside  actors,  rather  than  supporting  one 
against  the  other  in  their  bid  for  regional 
hegemony.    3 
 
EGMONT Royal Institute for International Relations 
 
The  EU  has  major  instruments  and 
expertise  to  give  substance  to  partnership,  in 
the  economic,  social,  political,  and  security 
field. Large-scale infrastructure projects, e.g. in 
the energy and transport sector (linking up our 
southern  neighbours);  university  scholarships; 
training and educating armed forces, police and 
judiciary;  deploying  in  theatre  to  help 
neighbours  secure  their  borders  and  combat 
security challenges emanating from within the 
region and further south (as the EU is starting 
to  do  with  the  new  CSDP  operations  in  the 
Sahel). These are just a few examples of real 
engagement.  
  
THE  AMERICAN  PIVOT  HINGES  ON 
EUROPE  
The Arab Spring highlights what should be an 
obvious  truth.  Critics  of  the  EU’s  lack  of 
engagement in Asia have a point, but they do 
tend to overlook that unlike the US, the EU 
simply cannot afford to shift the thrust of its 
strategic  engagement  to  the  Asia-Pacific.  The 
Arab Spring, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the 
struggle  for  dominance  over  the  Gulf,  the 
frozen conflicts, the Zwischeneuropa of Belarus, 
Moldova  and  Ukraine:  our  broader 
neighbourhood  is  simultaneously  one  of  the 
world’s most strategic and most volatile. If the 
EU  were  able  to  stabilize  its  periphery,  that 
would make it far from a peripheral power.  
 
Meanwhile,  the  American  pivot  is 
happening.  Washington  expects  that  every 
European  will  do  his  duty: h e n c e f o r t h  p e a c e  
and stability in our neighbourhood is first and 
foremost our responsibility. That cannot even 
be  considered  illogical,  whether  seen  from 
Washington or Brussels. Inadvertently or not, 
the US is now demanding European strategic 
autonomy,  at  least  regionally,  for  its  pivot  is 
partially dependent on Europe’s ability to take 
care of its own business. If Europeans would 
prove  unable  to  contain  a  crisis  that  poses  a 
serious threat to the continent, the US would 
have no choice but to intervene because of its 
own  vital  interests.  In  that  sense  the  US 
remains a European power. Washington might 
just  decide  to  make  its  point  though  by 
withholding support in a crisis that is important 
to Europe without threatening its vital interests 
– like Libya.  
 
The Libyan crisis has shown once again that 
today  Europeans  have  no  common  view  on 
which  types  of  crises  in  which  parts  of  the 
world they feel responsible for. Europe’s level 
of  ambition  as  a  security  provider  remains 
undefined. The American pivot not only forces 
Europeans  to  think  about  this,  but  to  do  so 
collectively, in an EU framework even.  
 
First,  Europeans  have  to  invest  in  the 
capabilities which the autonomy that is forced 
upon them requires. They will notably have to 
acquire  their  own  strategic  enablers  (air-to-air 
refuelling, targeting, strategic transport etc.) for 
crisis  management  operations,  so  as  to  allow 
American  means  to  be  diverted  elsewhere 
(whereas for the 2011 Libya campaign 90% of 
enablers  were  American,  which  means  that 
without US support Europeans would still have 
been  able  to  flatten  a  substantial  part  of  the 
country but not in a militarily, legally, politically 
or  morally  acceptable  way).  No  single 
European country is capable of generating such 
capabilities  on  its  own:  the  only  feasible 
solution is a collective European one.  
 
Second,  such  collective  decisions  on  the 
future  capability  mix  (as  well  as  intelligence-
gathering  and  contingency  planning)  require 
that  first  Europeans  agree  on  functional  and 
geographic  priorities  for  the  most  likely 
deployments,  in  function  of  their  common 
interests  and  foreign  policy.  Third,  the 
American pivot implies a less pronounced role 
in NATO. The eternal EU-NATO debate has 
lost all meaning, for NATO minus the US push 
factor  simply  equals  those  same  internally 
divided  Europeans  again.  The  way  to  keep 
NATO  viable  is  to  reinforce  European 
ownership of it, which starts with reinforcing 
Europe – the EU.    4 
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In a way, the European Security and Defence 
Identity (ESDI) is being revived. But where the 
original 1990s concept saw the ESDI as a mere 
technical European pillar firmly anchored in and 
subservient to NATO, today an “ESDI Plus” is 
needed: anchored outside NATO and receiving 
its strategic guidance from the EU. Let us simply 
call it the Common Security and Defence Policy 
(CSDP)  therefore.  Europeans  would 
collectively define a strategy for crisis 
management.  They  would  collectively 
develop  capabilities  through  “Pooling 
&  Sharing”  in  the  framework  of  the 
CSDP,  double-hatting  it  as  the 
European pillar of NATO in order to 
guarantee  interoperability  and 
incorporate  their  collective  aims  as 
such in the NATO Defence Planning 
Process.  And  they  would  collectively 
deploy  for  crisis  management,  under 
the  political  aegis  of  the  EU,  making 
use  of  the  most  suitable  national  or  NATO 
headquarters  (or  its  own  Operations  Centre) 
according to the case at hand.  
 
THE  CRISIS  AND  THE  SCRAMBLE  FOR 
EUROPE  
Just as the Arab Spring and the American pivot 
force the EU to step up its strategic engagement, 
the  financial  and  economic  crisis  puts  a  great 
limit on the means for doing so. There is less 
money,  and  also  less  bandwidth  available  for 
foreign policy. The world does not stand still, 
but as the Heads of State and Government have 
to devote summit after summit to the rescue of 
the Euro, EU foreign policy inevitably loses out.  
 
The crisis also has geopolitical implications. 
For  one,  the  prestige,  legitimacy,  and 
attractiveness  of  the  EU  have  been  greatly 
damaged. The fundamental decision to maintain 
the  Euro  and,  by  extension,  the  European 
project  by  deepening  financial  and  economic 
integration  has  been  taken  (to  be  followed, 
hopefully, by fiscal and social integration). But 
the painfully drawn-out decision-making creates 
the image of a weak Union paralyzed by dissent 
and  unable  to  take  resolute  action.  The 
vaunted European model appears not to work 
so  well  after  all.  That  appearance  is  most 
probably  wrong  (optimism  remains 
mandatory) but it does create a real loss of soft 
power  that  handicaps  any  foreign  policy 
initiative  from  the  start.  Schadenfreude  is  a 
powerful emotion.  
 
The  loss  of  hard  power  is  real  too.  As 
Europe is hit much harder by the crisis than 
the  emerging  powers,  its  relative  position  in 
the world continues to decline. The “scramble 
for  Europe”  has  not  quite  begun  yet,  but 
China is not the only one on the lookout for 
strategic acquisitions. Giving substance to the 
so-called strategic partnerships with the BRICS 
and  others  becomes  even  more  challenging 
than it already was as they sense Europe’s loss 
of  confidence.  This  is  also  evident  in  the 
various multilateral forums, where the voice of 
the EU (and the US for that matter) is often 
drowned out.  
 
Grand  strategy  starts  at  home  therefore. 
The  first  step  towards  success  in  external 
action is rapid and resolute internal action to 
finally create the deepened economic, financial, 
fiscal and social union that already at the start 
of the crisis, and after years of procrastination, 
still  today  everybody  identifies  as  the  way 
ahead for Europe. Let us now do it then.  
 
***** 
“Just  as  the  Arab  Spring  and  the 
American  pivot  force  the  EU  to 
step  up  its  strategic  engagement, 
the  financial  and  economic  crisis 
puts a great limit on the means for 
doing so.”   5 
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The  crisis,  the  American  pivot  and  the  Arab 
Spring  also  lead  to  an  even  more  basic 
conclusion:  grand  strategy  is  necessary.  The 
Arab Spring e.g. cannot be discussed only within 
the box of the ENP, because it might necessitate 
the  decision  to  reallocate  funds  from  other 
policies  to  the  ENP,  or  to  shift  the  focus  of 
other  policies  (such  as  development)  to  the 
region.  Furthermore,  events  in  the  real  world 
don’t  respect  the  confines  of  EU  policies: 
developments in the ENP countries cannot be 
dissociated from what goes on in the Sahel, the 
Horn and the Gulf. All three factors have major 
implications for EU foreign policy overall and 
therefore demand a debate on strategy overall, 
rather  than  just  a  debate  at  the  level  of  sub-
strategies and individual policy areas.  
 
Organizing a review of the ESS is one means 
of provoking the real debate, on grand strategy, 
hence this author’s consistent plea in favour of 
such a review. It is an obvious means of doing 
so – but not an end in itself. If the grand strategy 
debate can be launched in a different manner, by 
all means let us go ahead.  
 
A POWERFUL IDEA  
But, if and when the EU does chart its strategic 
course,  it  also  needs  a  strategic  narrative.  It 
needs to explain and legitimize its grand strategy 
to citizens, parliaments, and the world, especially 
if it claims a “distinctive European approach to 
foreign  and  security  policy”  (as  in  the  2008 
Report on the Implementation of the ESS). For that 
purpose,  an  ESS-type  document  is  an  ideal 
vehicle, as the persistence of the 2003 edition in 
the  EU  discourse  (even  though  not  in  actual 
decision-making) and in the public debate has 
proven. In that sense, reviewing the ESS does 
constitute an end in itself.  
 
A  new  ESS  should  not  start  from  the 
threats  and  challenges  (which  Europe  does 
face) for that would be too negative, defensive, 
and  reactive,  and  hence  self-defeating. 
Europe’s strategic narrative should confidently 
set out a positive agenda: what does the EU set 
out  to  achieve  in  this  world?  Optimism  is 
mandatory therefore.  
 
Optimism  is  justified  too.  If  there  is  a 
tendency to be defensive, it is because Europe 
has a lot to lose. Europeans have constructed a 
very distinctive society, through a combination 
of  democracy,  capitalism,  and  strong 
government  (intervening  at  EU  and 
Member  State  level  to  ensure  the  fair 
functioning  of  the  market  and  to 
provide the public goods which it does 
not  generate).  As  Tony  Judt  states  in 
Postwar (Penguin, 2006, p. 793), there is a 
“European Social Model”. Representing 
“an  implicit  contract  between 
governments and citizens, as well as between 
one citizen and another”, it is not so much a 
set  of  uniform  rules  and  practices  across 
Europe (for there are many local variations) as 
“a sense – sometimes spelled out in documents 
and laws, sometimes not – of the balance of 
social  rights,  civic  solidarity  and  collective 
responsibility  that  was  appropriate  and 
possible for the modern state”.  
 
That  model  works:  Europe  is  one  of  the 
regions that is the most successful in providing 
the greatest security, prosperity and freedom to 
the greatest number of citizens. Put differently, 
it is one the world’s most equal regions. And 
only  where  governments  equally  provide  all 
citizens with security, prosperity and freedom 
are lasting peace and stability possible. The idea 
and fundamental purpose of Europe itself should 
also  be  at  the  core  of  EU  external  action. 
Because where governments don’t provide for 
“Ten  years  on,  a  2013  ESS  can 
deliver  a  strong  and  credible 
message: Europe has an idea and 
will set out to promote it.”   6 
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their  citizens,  tensions  will  arise,  instability, 
repression and conflict will follow, and citizens 
will  eventually  revolt  and  regimes  implode, 
violently or peacefully. The best way therefore 
to guarantee peace and stability around the EU 
is to stimulate governments outside the EU to 
similarly  provide  for  their  citizens,  to  the 
mutual benefit of all: this is a positive agenda. 
A Secure Europe in a Better World – the 2003 ESS 
already said it.  
 
In its southern neighbourhood, the EU until 
recently  ignored  the  core  idea  of  its  own 
strategy,  working  with  any  regime  willing  to 
cooperate  on  terrorism  and  illegal  migration, 
regardless  of  its  record  in  providing  for  its 
citizens. Thus when the Arab Spring happened, 
the EU found itself in a very bad position. The 
negative lesson is that focussing on short-term 
interests  is  short-sighted.  In  the  long  term, 
interests coincide with the values on which the 
European idea is founded. The positive lesson 
is  that  the  aspiration  to  security,  prosperity, 
freedom and equality is universal. Much more 
than  before  the  Arab  Spring,  there  is 
momentum today to advance that agenda.  
 
Ten  years  on,  a  2013  ESS  can  deliver  a 
strong and credible message therefore: Europe 
has an idea and will set out to promote it.  
 
No need to change the way of doing things: 
the  preventive,  holistic  and  multilateral 
approach  remains  valid.  But  it  should  be 
emphasized  which  common  vital  interests  that 
method  will  guarantee:  defence  against  any 
military  threat  to  EU  territory;  open  lines  of 
communication  and  trade;  a  secure  supply  of 
energy  and  other  natural  resources;  a 
sustainable  environment;  manageable 
migration; the maintenance of international law 
and universally agreed rights; the autonomy of 
decision-making  of  the  EU  and  its  Member 
States.  Then  what  is  to  be  achieved  can  be 
defined  more  clearly,  mapping  out  the  new 
strategic course in the priority areas of external 
action  where  Member  States  agree  there  is 
added  value  in  collective  action:  the  broader 
neighbourhood,  strategic  partnerships,  the 
multilateral architecture, and the EU’s role as a 
security  provider.  On  that  strong  and  clear 
mandate  for  EU  external  action  across  the 
board, the President of the European Council 
and the High Representative can act with the 
Member States.  
 
CONCLUSION  
There  is  one  major  caveat  however.  Grand 
strategy  starts  at  home,  but  can  also  end  at 
home.  A  strategy  founded  on  promoting  an 
idea outside the EU cannot be credible if the 
idea  is  no  longer  adhered  to  within  it:  that 
would  kick  the  feet  from  under  the  EU’s 
strategic  narrative.  If  obsessed  with  austerity 
the EU would save the Euro the wrong way, it 
would by extension not save but destroy the 
European  project.  Citizens  would  no  longer 
feel  committed  to  a  Union  or  a  national 
government that mistook the Euro for an end 
in  itself,  to  the  detriment  of  the  Union’s 
fundamental  purpose  –  their  security, 
prosperity  and  freedom.  Great  internal 
instability would be the result – hardly a base 
for decisive external action. Fortunately it has 
dawned  on  Europe’s  leaders  what  the 
fundamental purpose of the Union is, and that 
jobs and growth are more likely to contribute 
to it than any golden rule.  
 
If that realization is now quickly translated 
into  decisive  action,  the  EU  will  soon  also 
realize  that  the  Arab  Spring,  the  American 
pivot and the crisis all present opportunities, 
that it has all the means to be one of the poles 
of this multipolar word – to be in effect a great 
power – if only it wants to be. Being a power 
does  not  necessarily  entail  playing  classic 
power games. EU strategy has been and will 
continue to be distinctive, seeking to further its 
interests  without  harming  the  legitimate 
interests  of  others.  But  it  does  imply  action. 
That means more than reacting to events: the 
EU must simultaneously try to shape events in 
function of its strategic priorities. And it means   7 
 
 
EGMONT Royal Institute for International Relations 
 
 
more than “normative power” (showing good 
manners  in  the  hope  that  they  will  be 
emulated):  the  EU  must  also  be  seen  to  act 
upon  its  strategy.  That  means  proactively 
promoting  the  values  on  which  its  model  is 
based.  
 
Judt concludes his masterwork in that sense 
(p. 800): “America would have the biggest army 
and  China  would  make  more,  and  cheaper, 
goods.  But  neither  China  nor  America  had  a 
serviceable  model  to  propose  for  universal 
emulation. […] it was Europeans who were now 
uniquely  placed  to  offer  the  world  some 
modest advice on how to avoid repeating their 
own  mistakes.  Few  would  have  predicted  it 
sixty years before, but the twenty-first century 
might yet belong to Europe”.  
 
Optimism is mandatory.  
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